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 In this work, two differential equation models for smallpox are numerically solved to find 
the optimal intervention policy. In each model we look for the range of values of the parameters 
that give rise to the worst case scenarios. Since the scale of an epidemic is determined by the 
number of people infected, and eventually dead, as a result of infection, we attempt to quantify 
the scale of the epidemic and recommend the optimum intervention policy. In the first case 
study, we mimic a densely populated city with comparatively big tourist population, and heavily 
used mass transportation system. A mathematical model for the transmission of smallpox is 
formulated, and numerically solved. In the second case study, we incorporate five different 
stages of infection: (1) susceptible (2) infected but asymptomatic, non infectious, and vaccine-
sensitive; (3) infected but asymptomatic, noninfectious, and vaccine-in-sensitive; (4) infected but 
asymptomatic, and infectious; and (5) symptomatic and isolated. Exponential probability 
distribution is used for modeling this case. We compare outcomes of mass vaccination and trace 
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 What would happen if biological agents such as smallpox were deliberately released in a 
large population where individuals gather randomly? What would be the worst-case scenarios? 
Are there measures in place to prevent such scenarios? According to World Health Organization 
smallpox was eradicated in 1980, but there are still official repositories in both the U.S and 
Russia. Not only do these repositories exist, but also in special adaptations, they are easily usable 
in bombs and missiles. Hence, it is quite logical that there is great concern about readiness of a 
state or nation in the events of a smallpox attack. After 9/11, the U.S. government has responded 
to such threat by stockpiling an estimated 300 million doses of smallpox vaccines alone 
compared to just 50 million worldwide before September 11, 2001 [4]. Obviously, the U.S. 
government wouldn’t have reacted so quickly and in such a magnitude if the threat were 
insignificant. Besides, what makes smallpox a weapon of terror is it kills 30% of infected 
(unvaccinated) individuals, and there are no specific treatments [4]. And since smallpox 
vaccination programs ended about 30 years ago, and effectiveness of a smallpox vaccine is 
assumed to last for 10 to 30 years [9], we can assume that most of the population has no 
immunity. Therefore, if such an event were to take place, the result would be devastating. 
 Potential threat of bioterrorism is a big concern for many policy makers, scientists and 
public health officials. As a result, it necessitates a rational contingency planning that integrates 
as many variables as possible. Nevertheless the main focus should be at identifying control 
measures that minimizes the total number of deaths. Since mass vaccination is often the 
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recommended strategy, proper planning needs to account for adverse side effects that some 
experience due to vaccination. It would be unfortunate if a national mass vaccination campaign 
caused more deaths than an isolated epidemic. Even worse, there is tendency to extrapolate 
crucial parameter values from past epidemic outbreaks. Unfortunately, this practice is misleading 
because in last 35 years, there has been so much change in the population size, mobility patterns, 
and social interactions. 
 Mathematical models of the transmission of infectious disease are essential tools in 
making timely assessment of the spread of an infectious disease. Models can integrate 
epidemiological and biological data to give quantitative analysis of pattern of spread and the 
effect of control strategies. The model can also provide an approximate scale of fatalities and 
identify specific control strategies that produce an optimal result.  
1.2 Epidemiological Principles 
 A disease is infectious if at some stage in the life cycle (of the appropriate organism), it is 
transmissible from an infected host to an unaffected susceptible with or without intermediate 
vector. Once an individual receives the infectious organism via direct contact, breathing in, or 
eating etc, the person is said to be exposed to the infection. Not every single exposure results in 
the infection. Sometimes the individual is naturally immune to the organism concerned due to 
previous exposure to the disease or through immunization. The invading organism, on the other 
hand, follows its own life cycle. Usually, we observe the elapse of a latent period during which 
there is internal development but the person is not capable to transmitting infectious material. 
The actively infectious person is usually called infective and the period during which s/he is 
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infectious is called the infectious period [5]. At some stage the infected person shows clinical 
symptoms, which for an acute infection, is the signal for isolating the person from the 
community until recovery or death. If symptoms appear before the onset of infectious period, 
isolating the person will prevent the spread of infection significantly. But generally, symptoms 
appear after the onset of infectiousness, in which case, the relevant period of time for the 
transmission of disease is from the end of the latent period to the removal from circulation [8]. 
Although there is slight chance of transmission after the isolation, it is ignored. Sometimes, the 
symptoms appear after the infectious period has ended, in which case, the length and time of 
infectious period is not certain. In any case, the latent period and incubation period is used 
interchangeably, although the latter is the time elapsed between the exposure and the appearance 
of symptoms [8]. The difference between the two is obvious when we look at a disease where the 
symptoms occur either during or after the infectious period. In this case, the incubation period is 
the sum of the latent period and the part of the infectious period during which the person is 
capable of transmitting disease. 
 From a mathematical modeling perspective, the lengths of the latent and infectious 
periods are represented by some probability distribution functions. For example, the continuous 
model by Mc Kendrick and Bartlett [2] assume the latent period to be zero and infectious period 
to be negative exponentially distributed. Bailey [2], in the chain-binomial model, uses a normal 
frequency distribution for length of the latent period and some constant for the length of 
infectious period. Therefore, depending on the choice of distribution function, the final size of an 
epidemic varies significantly among different models. 
 Given that there is a contact between an infective and a susceptible, whether the disease 
is transmitted or not, is a matter of chance. The magnitude of this chance depends on various 
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factors like the virulence of the disease, the extent to which virus has been discharged, the 
immunity level of the susceptible, the proximity of the infective to the susceptible etc. [8]. In the 
binomial model [2], term adequate contact is used to refer to those contacts that result in the 
transmission of the disease. In the continuous model [5], the chance of a new infection during a 
short interval of time is proportional to the product of the length of the interval, the number of 
susceptibles and the number of infectives. In addition, the continuous model [5] assumes that all 
the susceptibles and the infectives mix together homogeneously in the community, clearly at 
variance with the observed facts of the social behavior. For example, children from a particular 
school/community are more likely to mix with children from the same school/community closely 
compared to those from neighboring districts. 
1.3 Smallpox 
 Smallpox is a viral disease that can be transmitted from a person to person via inhalation 
of air droplets or from the aerosols from an infected person or via direct contact with the infected 
person [4]. Transmission of this disease can take place at a 7-foot-radius of the infected person 
[4]. The incubation period is approximately 21 days, with an uninfectious incubation period of 
about 12 days, typically followed by a 2-4 days of prodomal period associated with mild 
symptoms and low infectiousness, then a highly infectious period of about 9 days [9]. 
 Smallpox is believed to have appeared around 6000 B.C [4]. For many centuries, the 
material from smallpox pustules was used for the process of variolation in Africa, China, India, 
countries in Europe, and in Americas [8]. In 1796, Edward Jenner started vaccinating people 
with cowpox to immunize against smallpox [8]. By early 1800s, the smallpox vaccine was 
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widely available. Although smallpox immunization programs existed in many parts of the globe, 
smallpox remained endemic. Smallpox was gradually eradicated after the World Health 
Organization (WHO) started global smallpox eradication program in 1967. The program 
involved extensive vaccination and rigorous surveillance to detect any signs of a smallpox 
outbreak. By the end of 1979, smallpox was officially eradicated from the globe [8]. Ever since, 
the world has been saving many lives and an estimated expenditure of 2 billion dollars every 
year [8]. 
1.4 History of Smallpox modeling 
 The first model for smallpox was formulated and analyzed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1760 
[8]. In 1906, Hamer formulated a model that assumed the incidence (number of new cases per 
unit time) to be proportional to the product of the densities of the susceptibles and infectives [6]. 
In 1926, Kermack and McKenrick came up with an epidemic threshold result (where density of 
susceptibles has to exceed a critical value in order for an outbreak occur [8]). Bailey followed the 
footsteps of Ross and McKendrick. Since then, mathematical models for infectious disease have 
grown exponentially. The recent models have incorporated many more parameters which were 
ignored in the previous models. There are deterministic differential equation models [4, 9], 
integral equation models [1], stochastic models [3, 6] etc., each with its own merits and demerits. 
 For deterministic models, compartments with labels such as M, S, E, I, and R are often 
used as epidemiological classes, where M, S, E, I, and R stand for immune, susceptible, exposed, 
infected and recovered respectively. The class M contains infants or individuals with passive or 
permanent immunity. Once there is adequate contact between susceptible and infective, 
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transmission occurs, then S becomes the exposed class E. E incorporates latency or incubation 
period, individuals who are infected but not infectious. At the end of latent period, individuals 
enter the class I, infectives. Individuals in class I are infectious, and are capable of transmitting 
the infection. When the infectious period ends, the individual enters the recovered class R 
consisting of those who are either dead or have life-long immunity. The choice of different 
compartments depends on the characteristics of the particular disease that is being modeled. 
Categorization of models into MSEIR, MSEIRS, SEIR, SEIRS, SIR, SIRS, SEI, SEIS, SI, or SIS 
solely depends on the flow patterns between compartments. 
1.5 Threshold quantities: Ro, σ, and Rn  
 The threshold for many epidemiology models is the basic reproduction number R0, 
defined as the average number of secondary infections produced by a single infected individual 
after entering the host population [10]. For most of the deterministic models, Ro determines the 
onset, the length, and the final size of an epidemic Sometimes, Ro   is also called the basic 
reproductive ratio or basic reproductive age 
 The contact number σ: is the average number of adequate contacts a typical infected 
individual makes during the entire infectious period. Note that adequate contact means a contact 
that is sufficient for transmission of disease. 
 The replacement number Rn: is defined as the average number of secondary infections 
produced by a typical infective during the entire infectious period. Note that Ro, σ, and Rn are 
equal (at the beginning) when the entire host population is susceptible. Also note that, σ and Rn 
are defined all throughout the epidemic whereas Ro is defined only at the time of invasion. For 
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most of the models, the reproduction number and the contact number remains constant, and can 
be used interchangeably. On the contrary, the replacement number changes, and is less than the 
reproductive number. This is because the fraction of susceptible population decreases as the 
infection spreads, and as a result, not all adequate contacts will produce an infection. In 




2.1 Formulating Model Equations and variables 
 At a given time t, suppose S(t) is the number of susceptibles , I(t) is the number of 
infectives, E(t) is the number exposed, R(t) is the number of removals or recoveries (Removed 
individuals represent those who have suffered the disease and have died or recovered, or have 
been vaccinated, or have been isolated from the population), and N is the total population. Here, 
s(t), e(t), i(t), and r(t) represent fractions of respective classes in the total population. Suppose β 
is the average number of contacts per person per unit time, then βI/N = βi is the average number 
of contacts made by one susceptible with infectives per unit time, and hence, βNis is the number 
of new cases generated per unit time. 
 Note that transfer rates like δM, εE, and γI in the model, correspond to exponentially 
distributed waiting times in the compartments. For example, the transfer rate γI corresponds to 
P(t) = exp(-γt), the fraction that is still in the infective class t units later, with 1/γ  as the mean 
waiting time. For smallpox, 1/γ is about 9 days, while 1/ε is 12 days [9]. But, there is no general 
agreement on exact value of 1/γ and 1/ε, and on kind of distribution for waiting time. For 
example, one could construct a model with waiting time distribution as a step function given by 
P(t) = 1 if 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, and P(t) = 0 otherwise. 
 
The simplest model: 
  Assumptions: 
1. Disease spreads through contact only.  
8 
2. Everyone is identical with respect to their susceptibility and immunity. 
3. A contact is an instantaneous event with no duration in time. 
4. The population mixes homogeneously and instantaneously. 
5. All susceptibles are equally at risk of infection from infected individuals. 
6. All infected individuals have a constant and equal infectiousness. 
7. Each of the classes is differentiable functions of a continuous variable say, time t. 
   
 The population is divided into two classes: susceptibles and infectives. An individual is 
susceptible if s/he is capable of being infected after coming in a contact with an infected 
individual. An individual is said to be infective if s/he is carrying the virus and is capable of 
transmitting the disease. Once a susceptible is infected, s/he becomes infective and remains in 
that state indefinitely. And the infectives continues to spread the disease until the end of the 
epidemic. Note: The total population is assumed to be closed for t  in the sense that there is 
no immigration or emigration. 
≥ 0
 By assumption, every time an infected person comes in contact with a susceptible, s/he 
will communicate the disease. Thus, during [ , ]t t t+ Δ  each infected individual will produce 
certain number of new cases. Using the Law of mass action (which states that the interaction 
between different kinds of particles is proportional to their masses [5]), the number of new 
infectives is given by 1 2 ( )tS tβ β Δ . Here β1, β2 ∈  0,1[ ] and 2 tβ Δ is the fraction of the susceptible 
population that come in contact with infectives, and β1 is the fraction of these that become 
infected during the interval. Combining β1 and β2, we get just β, the contact rate. Therefore, the 
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number of new infectives ( ),I tΔ  during the time interval [ , ]t t t+ Δ  is given by  IS tβ Δ .As limit 
of  tends to zero, the number of infectives at time t is given by tΔ
/ (dI dt I N I )β= −           (2.1)  
with   (0) 0,  (0) 0,  ( ) ( ) .o oS S I I S t I t= ≥ = ≥ + = N
The SI model is a very special case of MSEIR model, in which, the immune class M, the 
exposed class E, and the removed or the recovered class R is omitted. 















I N I e β−
=
+ −
      (2.2) 
 




















Figure 1: Solution of the SI model 
 
Fig.1 predicts that the disease will spread until there is no more susceptibles left to infect. 
Although oversimplified, the model is suitable when the disease is highly contagious and spreads 
rapidly in the closed community.  
10 
 At steady state, = 0. Clearly, there are two equilibrium solutions, , and /dI dt ( ) 0I t =
( )I t N= . The first one is not an interesting solution. The second one on the other hand, means 
that an introduction of one infectious individual will infect the whole population, and the 
epidemic is independent of the initial size of attack. This is the simplest epidemic model.  
 Now let us improve the model by allowing the possibility of recovery or removal during 
the period of the epidemic. Following recovery or removal, an individual either becomes 
immune or dies. 
 




E Exposed  
I Infective 
R Recovered  
m,s,e,i,r Fractions of the population in the above classes  
β Contact rate 
1/ω Average period of immunity 
1/ε Average latent/incubation period 
1/γ Average infectious period 
Ro Basic reproduction number 
σ Contact number 
Rn Replacement number 
 
2.2 The Classic Epidemic model 
 Using the notation in the table 1 and section 2.1, the classic Kermack and McKendrick 
epidemic model is given below. 
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 / / ,  
/ / ,    
/ ,  
dS dt IS N








         (2.3) 
with  (0) 0, (0) 0, ( ) 0, ( ) ( ) ( )o o oS S I I R t R S t I t R t= ≥ = ≥ = ≥ + + = N
 
Note that the number of people recovering per unit time is dependent on the number of 
infectives. This model uses the standard incidence and has recovery rate of Iγ , corresponding to 
an exponential waiting time te γ− . Dividing (2.3) by N and denoting d/dt as , we get   ′
 
,           (0) 0,
,       (0) 0,
( ) 1 ( ) ( ).
o
o
s is s s
i is i i i
r t s t i t
β
β γ
′ = − = ≥ ⎫
⎪′ = − = ≥ ⎬
⎪= − − ⎭
        (2.4) 
 
where  , , are the fractions in the given classes. Here, ( )r t ( )i t ( )s t /β γ σ= , the contact number, 
the product of contact rate β  per unit time and the average infectious period 1/ γ . Similarly, the 
replacement number 0Rn Sσ= , at the beginning of the epidemic.  
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Figure 2: Solutions of classic SIR epidemic model with contact number σ (alpha) = 3, and average infectious period 
of 1/ = 3 days. γ
 
Fig.2 shows the solutions of SIR model with contact number 3, and average infectious period of 
3 days. According to Fig.2, a typical epidemic outbreak follows a bell-shaped curve, with the 
fraction of infective population increasing from I0 (near zero) reaching a maximum and gradually 
coming back towards zero. The susceptible fraction on the other hand, starts near 1 and decreases 
to a small positive value at steady state. Note that when the fraction of susceptible population 
goes below 1/ , the replacement number σ ( ) 1S tσ < , as a result the epidemic dies out. 
 At time t = 0, the fraction of susceptible and infective population are  and 
respectively, with 
0s
0i 0 0  1s i+ =  (since initially there is no removal term). Thus equation 2.4 (ii) 
becomes 
 [ ] 0 00( ) ( ).ti t i sβ γ=′ = −  
Unless 0 0,sβ γ− > that is, 0s γ β>  there will be no epidemics. Let γ β λ=  be the relative 
removal rate. In order for the epidemic to start, the susceptible population has to be greater than 
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the relative removal rate. If  is small then 0i 0s 1≈ , and in this case, λ  can be regarded as the 
threshold susceptible population. In general, the susceptible population is a decreasing function 
of time and hence,  for all t > 0. 0( )s t s>
By dividing  one obtains a quotient differential equation.  /  by /di dt ds dt
11 1 ( 1
1 11 1
di si i







= = − + = − + = − +
−




The solution paths shown in Fig.3 are obtained from this equation. According to the figure, for 
1 /s σ> , the equilibrium points along s-axis are neutrally unstable and vice versa for 1 /s σ< .  
 





















 alpha = 3
 
Figure 3: Phase plane portrait for the classic SIR model with contact number alpha =3. 
 
Figure 3 shows the phase plane portrait of SIR model with contact number 3 and average 






⎟ . Integrating both sides, we get 
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ln  si s
σ
= − + +C , where C is an integrating constant. Applying initial conditions, we get 
0 0
1 lnC i s sσ= + − 0  
0
0 0
lnln ssi s i s
σ σ
= − + + + −  




lnln ssi s i s
σ σ
+ − = + −          (2.5) 
 
We can summarize the characteristics of a SIR model by the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.1 [8] Suppose  is a solution of SIR model given in (2.3). If( ( ), ( ))s t i t 0 1Sσ ≤ ,  
decreases to zero as t  tends to infinity. If 
( )i t
0 1,sσ > then  first increases up to a maximum 
value 
( )i t
[ ]max 0 0 01/ ln( ) /i i s sσ σ= + − − σ  and then decreases to zero as t tends to infinity. The 
susceptible fraction is a decreasing function of t and at the steady state, value of ( )s ∞  is the 
unique root in (0,1 /σ ) of the equation ( )0 0 0ln / / 0i s s s s σ∞ ∞+ − + =  
 One interpretation of the Theorem 1.1 is that if there are enough people who are already 
immune such that a typical infective can only replaces itself with no more than one infective, 
then  decreases, and there is no epidemic outbreak. But if a typical infective initially infect 
more than one person i.e.
( )i t
0 1,sσ > then i(t) increases and as a result, an epidemic outbreak occurs. 
Since is a quantity that is measurable, let us seek the solution for . If we can obtain data 
for  we might be able to validate the conclusion of the model. 
( )r t ( )r t
( )r t
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Dividing by  we get /ds dt / ,dr dt /ds dr s Rnσ= − = − where Rn is the replacement number.  
/ds s dr.σ= − Now integrating both sides, and using the initial condition we get, 0
rs s e σ−=  
So, 0(1 ) (1 )
rr r s r s e σγ γ −′ = − − = − −  




rr r s r σγ σ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤′ = − − − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
2 2
0 0(1 ) ( 1) 2!
rr s r s σγ σ⎛ ⎞′ = − + − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
Integrating both sides, we get  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1/ 22 2
1/ 20 0 0 2 2
0 0 0 02
0
2 2 11( ) 1 tan 2 2 1
2
s s s
r t s t s s s
s
σ σ σ
σ γ σ σ σ
σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− + + −
⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= − − − + + −










⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⇒ = − − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 or  ( )02
0






⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
Where  and ( )
1/ 22 2
0 01 2s sς σ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
-1
0
1tan ( ( 1))sθ σ
ς
= − . 









ς γ ςγ θ
σ
′ = −  
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Figure 4: Shows the plot of  i(  and r ( versus t. t) t)′
 
From the Figure 4 we can see that the rate of recovery builds up and gradually dies away. The 
time at which there is maximum number of infected individuals match with peak of 
(rprime(t)). To determine the size of the epidemic, we need to find eventual number of 
removals, let it be . When t , we get 
( )r t′










⎡ − +⎣∞ =
⎤⎦ . Using Taylor expansion for ς , and using only first term 0 1,sς σ= − we 
get  
0
2 1( ) (1 ) 2 / 3r
sσ σ
∞ = −  [ ].  
0
taking σ = 3 and s 1
Note: There is a noticeable difference in value of r( )∞ compared to r(40) in figure 2. The error is 
due to an approximation used to obtain r’(t) and ς . 
 
Now, let us consider a model with vital dynamics (births and deaths). This model is relevant 
when the disease is endemic. Smallpox was endemic for a long period of time, until it was finally 
eradicated. The classic endemic model is given below. 
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,    (0) 0,
,       (0) 0,
,                 (0) 0,
( ) ( ) ( ) .
dS ISN S S S
dt N
dI IS I I I I
dt N
dR I R R
dt




⎫= − − = ≥ ⎪
⎪
⎪= − − = ≥ ⎪
⎬
⎪
= − = Κ ≥ ⎪
⎪
+ + = ⎪⎭
       (2.6) 
 
 The difference between classic SIR epidemic and endemic model is that in the case of 
latter, there is constant inflow of new susceptibles Nμ  (due to births), and outflows (as natural 
deaths) at rate , ,  andS I Rμ μ μ in respective classes. However, the total population N is assumed 
to be constant, that is, at any given time, total number of births equal to total number of deaths. 
The mean life time varies from country to country but for our purpose, we will take one for the 
United States which is about 75 years [8]. Like in the previous model, dividing each of the 




( ) ,     (0) 0,
( ) ,       (0) 0,      
with ( ) 1 ( ) ( ).
s t s is s s
i t is i i i i
r t s t i t
μ μ β
β γ μ
′ = − − = ≥ ⎫
⎪′ = − − = ≥ ⎬
⎪= − − ⎭
       (2.7) 
 
 The triangle T in the si phase plane given by ( ){ }, | 0, 0, 1T s i s i s i= ≥ ≥ + ≤ is positively 
invariant and unique solution exists in T for all time [8]. Like in the previous model, the contact 
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number stays constant throughout and is equal to the reproductive number . From (2.7), 0R
( ) [ ( )]. i t i sβ γ μ′ = − + Simplifying the right hand side, we get 
( ) ( ) ( 1).si t i βγ μ
γ μ
′ = + −
+
So, the threshold quantity 0R ( )σ=  is  +
β
γ μ
for this model. It is the 




Let us consider 2 cases: 
Case 1: 0 1R σ= ≤ ,  0 0i >
Since can never be greater than 1, the replacement number s(t) 1R sσ= < , making always 
less than 1. This means infective fraction quickly goes to zero. Fig. 6 shows that this conclusion 
is indeed true. In the long run (over 100 or more years), people who were infected but recovered, 
slowly die off. Since there is constant inflow of new susceptibles, fractions  gradually 
increases until This is a disease-free equilibrium. 
( )i t′
(t)
( ) 1,  and ( ) 0.s t i t= =
Case 2: 0 1R σ= > ,  0i 0>
 In this case, the replacement number 1R sσ= > , making ( )i t′ always greater than 1. This 
means the infective fraction grows exponentially until it reaches a peak and then decays just like 
in the SIR epidemic model. However, in the long run (10 to 20 years), once the infective fraction 
has been reduced to a low level, the process of deaths of recovered people and the births of new 
susceptibles increases susceptible fraction to the point when  sσ  is large enough to incite a 
smaller epidemic. This process of an alternation between rapid epidemics and slow regeneration 
continues until solution paths approaches the endemic equilibrium. The value of the endemic 
equilibrium is given in Theorem 2.2 below. 
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Note: The endemic equilibrium occurs when replacement number 1sσ = . As soon as 1sσ > , the 
infective fraction increases resulting in an epidemic and vice versa.  
 
Theorem 2.2 [8] Suppose (  is the solution of equation (2.7). If ( ), ( ))s t i t 01 or 0,iσ ≤ = then 
solution paths starting in T approach the disease-free equilibrium given by and If 1s = 0.i =
1,σ > then all solution paths with approach the endemic equilibrium given 0 0i > 1/es σ= and 
( )1 /ei μ σ= − β . Fig. 6 and Fig.7 illustrate the two cases given in theorem. 
 






















 Ro = alpha = 3
 mu = 1/60
 
 
Figure 5: Solutions of the classic SIR endemic model with contact number σ =3 and μ =1/60. 
 























 mu = 1/60




Figure 6: Phase plane portrait for the classic SIR endemic model with σ = 0.3, 1/γ = 3 days, 1/µ = 60 days 
 























 mu = 1/60
 alpha = 3
 
 
Figure 7: Phase plane portrait for the classic SIR endemic model with σ  = 3, 1/γ = 3 days, 1/µ = 60 days. 
 
Let us use linear stability analysis and investigate the nature of trajectory in a small region near 
the endemic equilibrium solution. From Theorem 2.2, equilibrium solution is 









( )11( ) ( ),   ( ) ( )s t t i t tμ σξ η
σ β
−
= + = + where ( )tξ  and ( )tη  are small perturbations in  




( )tξ  and ( )tη , we get ( )'( ) ( )tt tβηξ μσξ
σ
= − −  and ( )'( ) ( ) 1t tη μξ σ= − . 
and after eliminating ( )tξ  we get, ( )2 ''( ) '( ) 1 ( ) 0t t tση μσ η βμ σ η+ + − = . 
This second order differential equation describes the behavior of the solution of (2.7) near the 
equilibrium state. The exact nature of the solution of (2.7) depends on the parametersβ , ,μ γ 
andσ . As long as contact number 1σ > and all the parameters are positive, both ( )tξ and ( )tη  
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tends to 0 as . This indicates that the equilibrium solution is a stable solution 
corresponding to endemic state of the disease. In particular, when 
t → ∞
3 4 ( -1)μσ β σ< , the solution 
of 2nd order differential equation becomes a damped harmonic oscillation. Thus when vital 
dynamic is included, the model displays periodic epidemic behavior.  
 Notice that there is exchange of stability at 1σ = . For 1σ < , there is a stable disease free 
equilibrium along  line As soon as 0.i = σ  is slightly greater than one then The equilibrium 
given by 
0.i >




= =  is unstable for 1σ < , however for 1,σ > the same equilibrium 
solution is locally asymptotically stable. The disease free equilibrium given by and 1s = 0i =  is 
locally stable for 1σ < , however it is unstable for 1σ > . Thus these two equilibria exchange 
stabilities as the endemic equilibrium moves from one to another. 
 
 2.4 SEIR Model 






,     (0) 0,
,      (0) 0,
,           (0) 0,
,                  (0) 0,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
dS ISN S S S
dt N
dE IS E E E E
dt N
dI E I I I I
dt
dR I R R K
dt





⎫= − − = ≥ ⎪
⎪
⎪= − − = ≥
⎪
⎪⎪= − − = ≥ ⎬
⎪
⎪= − = ≥ ⎪
⎪
+ + + = ⎪
⎪⎭
       (2.8) 
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  The SEIR model is similar to SIR endemic model except that it has an additional 
compartment E or exposed class. This compartment reflects an inclusion of incubation period. 







'( ) ,   (0) 0,
'( ) , (0) 0,
'( ) ,     (0) 0,
'( ) ,            (0) 0,
with ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) .
s t s is s s
e t is e e e e
i t e i i i i
r t i r r r





⎫= − − = ≥
⎪
= − − = ≥ ⎪
⎪= − − = ≥ ⎬
⎪= − = ≥ ⎪
⎪= − + + ⎭
       (2.9) 
 
Letting , the second equation of (2.9) yields '( ) 0e t ( ) .ise t β μ ε= +  Substituting expression 
for e(t) in the third equation gives, 
( ) ( )
'( )  1i t i sβε
μ ε γ μ
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
. So 
( ) ( )
βε
μ ε γ μ+ +
 is the 
threshold quantity. The threshold quantity can be interpreted as the product of the contact rate 
and average fraction β ε μ ε+  surviving the incubation period and average infectious period  
1
γ μ+  [8]. 
 The SEIR model always has at least one solution given by s = 1, and e = i = r = 0. If 
threshold quantity is greater than one then there is a unique endemic equilibrium solution in D 
where ( ){ },  ,  | 0,  0,  0,  1D e i r e i r e i r= ≥ ≥ ≥ + + ≤  [8]. Note: The replacement number 
 is equal to one at the endemic equilibrium. At steady state, all the time derivatives are 
equal to zero. That is, 
eRn = σs
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 0 ..( ), 0..( ), 0..( ), and 0..( ).       
.
s is i is e e ii e i i iii i r ivμ μ β β ε μ ε γ μ γ μ− − = − − = − − = − =  
Note: 
( ) ( )0
R βεσ
μ ε γ μ
= =
+ +
 and  are endemic equilibrium solutions for 
respective states. Substituting e = 1– s – i – r into (iii) yields, 
,  ,  ,  and e e es e i re
(1 ) ( ) 0s i r iε γ μ− − − − + =  
(1 ) ( ) 0s i r iε ε ε γ μ⇒ − − − − + = . Substituting value of r in terms of i from (iv), we get 
(1 ) ( ) 0is i iε ε εγ γ μ
μ
− − − − + =  
( )(1 ) ( ) 0e
isε μ γ ε μ
μ



























s s )R s
μ
βμεμ







(1 )( 1) 0







⇒ − − =
⇒ = =
 









μ γ γ μ
=
+ +
− . Substituting  from above in (iii), we get ei
( ) ( )
( ) 0 0




γ μ γ μ με μ
ε ε μ γ ε μ ε μ
+ +




( ) ( ) 0
1(1 )er R
γε
























 mu = 1/60
 gamma = 19/60
 beta = 6/5
 eta = 1/12
 alpha = 3.0
 Susceptible f raction
 Recov ered f raction
 Exposed fraction
 Inf ected f raction
 




= 5/6 and average infectious period 
1
γ μ+
 = 3. 
 























 mu = 1/60
 gamma = 19/60
 beta = 6/5
 eta = 1/12
 alpha = 3.0
 
 
Figure 9: Shows the phase plane portrait for SEIR model with contact number σ =3, contact rate β = 6/5, average 
fraction surviving latent period 
ε
ε μ+
= 5/6 and average infectious period 
1
γ μ+



























 mu = 1/60
 gamma = 19/60
 beta = 1/5
 eta = 1/12
 alpha = 0.5
 
 
Figure 10: Shows the phase plane portrait for SEIR model with contact number σ = 0.5, contact rate β = 1/5, average 
fraction surviving latent period 
ε
ε μ+
= 5/6 and average infectious period 
1
γ μ+
 = 3. 
 
2.5 Model with two interacting groups of individuals 
 Let us consider a deterministic model involving two groups of individuals interacting 
with each other. Interaction could be in terms of daily visits or emigration. For simplicity, we 
exclude incubation period. To incorporate interaction, let us introduce emigration rates, θ andφ : 
the first one for the susceptibles and the latter for the infectives.  So the equations for this model 
are given by 
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1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ),
with ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) and ( ) 1 ( ) ( ).
s t i i s s s
i t i i s i i i
s t i i s s s
i t i i s i i i
r t s t i t r t s t i t
β β θ
β β γ φ
β β θ
β β γ φ
′ = Π − + + − ⎫
⎪′ = + − + − ⎪⎪′ = Π − + − − ⎬
⎪′ = + − − − ⎪
= − − = − − ⎪⎭
     (2.10) 
 
Π  is the adjusted net inflow ( birth rate – death rate) into the susceptible populations. Letting the 







and, 1 2i i γ
Π
= = . 
Let us see what happens when we slightly deviate from the equilibrium solutions. Let  
 
1 2




= + = + =
+
       (2.11) 
 
Substituting (2.11) in (2.10), we get 
[ ] [ ]
1 1 2 2
1 1 1
1 1( ) 0,




η ηθ ζ ξ θζ ξ
γζ γ η φ ξ γ η φ ξ
− ⎫+ + + − + =
2
⎪′ ′ ′ ⎬
⎪− + + − + − − + = ⎭
  D d/dt,≡    (2.12) 
 
where 1
1 2 1 2






       (2.13) 
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Note that there are two other equations similar to (2.12), with suffixes 1 and 2 are interchanged. 




1 2 1 2
1( )( ) 0,





ξ ξ γ ζ ζ
+ ⎫+ + + = ⎪′ ′ ⎬
⎪+ − + = ⎭
 
        (2.14) 
 
On the contrary, if we subtract corresponding pair of equations, we get 
 
[ ]
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 2( 2 )( ) ( ) 0,  




ηθ ζ ζ ξ ξ
γ ζ ζ γ φ ξ ξ
− ⎫+ + − + − =
.
⎪′ ′ ⎬
⎪′− − + + − + − = ⎭
        (2.15) 
 
Eliminating 1 2( )ζ ζ−  and 1 2( )ξ ξ−  from (2.15), we get an equation which is a quadratic in D. 
The roots of this equation determine the nature of solutions for equation (2.10). Next, we 
consider the simulink diagram for such an interacting model. 
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Figure 11: Simulink diagram for a model with two interacting groups of individuals 
For the simulation, the values of the parameters used are listed below:  
6 2 2 -2 5
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
10 ,  10 , 10 , 3 10 , (0) 1.5 10 , (0) 5 10
(0) 20,  (0) 0,  and 10
S S
I I


































Figure 12: Solutions of the model with two interacting groups of individuals  
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In the absence of any interventions, Fig. 12 shows that the solution curves for two interacting 




 The goal of any interventions is to prevent an outbreak from sustaining itself. This can be 
done if the intervention carried out is able to reduce the reproductive number to less than one. 
There is general agreement that the control measure like isolation of infected individuals is 
relatively effective if the length of time between onset of infectiousness and the isolation is quite 
short. Therefore, a process of rapid case isolation and surveillance alone, as recommended by 
Eichner [6] is effective, if we can isolate most of the infectious individuals within one or two 
days after they have been infected. Eichner [6] argues that 1 to 2 days is reasonable time frame 
because an individual infected with smallpox, is infectious for at most 2 days before general rash 
appears. When rash appears, it is expected that infected individuals restrict their free movement 
and thus reduce the contact rate to a minimum value. However, Kaplan [9] argues that this 
measure is effective only for a small epidemic, but for larger epidemic driven by larger initial 
size of infectious individuals, he claims that Mass Vaccination is the best option. 
 According to WHO, there is no proven cure for smallpox, but can be prevented through 
vaccination. Vaccination is one of the major weapons against the spread of smallpox. 
Vaccination creates an artificial immunity amongst those individuals who otherwise would be 
susceptible. Vaccination given before exposure or within 3 to 4 days after the exposure to the 
infection protects up to 97% of the (vaccinated) individuals [4]. In any case, the goal is to 
acquire herd immunity i.e. have enough people immune to the infection so that an introduction of 
an infective does not lead to an epidemic. In the SIR model, this means keeping the susceptible 
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population fraction less than 1/σ (σ is contact number), i.e. keeping the immune fraction more 
than 1-1/σ = 1-1/ . For example, if , then the immune fraction has be greater than 2/3, if 
, then the immune fraction has to be greater than 4/5, and so on. Let us use the estimates of 
the basic reproductive numbers for measles 16, mumps 12, rubella 7, and smallpox 5 (upper end 
approximation) [8] to calculate immune fractions. Using the given values, immune fractions for 
measles, mumps, rubella and smallpox are 0.94, 0.89, 0.86 and 0.8 respectively. Measles, 
Mumps, and Rubella still persists, but smallpox has been eradicated. The reason is quite obvious. 




3.2 Vaccination model 
  Suppose that in any given day, the probability that one or more infectious individuals 
arrive to a neighborhood of population N is , some constant. Let G be a random variable that 
represents the number of days since an outbreak occurred and has geometric probability 
distribution given by 
a
{ } 1Pr (1 ) , 0,1, 2,...,gG g a a g−= = − = with mean value 1= .G a −  
 One of the goals of the vaccination (implemented before an outbreak) is to keep the 
number of the susceptibles down to a fixed level, say . Let 0s f  be the vaccine fatality rate. It is 
known that the chance of death from the vaccination vary according to age, the state of health, 
the vaccination status etc. [2]. With smallpox, there is much higher risk of complication 
following a vaccination among children, pregnant women, and those who have fatal diseases like 
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cancer, AIDS etc. Here, f   represents the average fatality rate. Let  be the average number 
of vaccinations carried out per day. So  depends on the number of vaccinators that are 
available 24/7 and the average number of people each can vaccinate per day. However, for a 
given number of vaccinations, we assume that the number of deaths follow a Poisson 
Distribution, with parameters . Hence, the average number of deaths due to 
vaccination is given by 
0( )q s
0( )q s
0,  , and ( )G f q s
 
0 0( ) = ( ) /U s fq s a  [2]        (3.1) 
 
Using the same notation as in the previous models, i.e. β  for contact rate, i(t) for number of  
individuals infected at given time t, etc, the number of new infectives during  is given by tΔ
0 ( )s i t tβ Δ .The probability that one infective at a given time, give rise to k infectives (including 
the initial one) is given by 
 
0 0 1(  ) (1 ) ,      1s t s t kkP t e e k
β β− − −= − ≥  [2]       (3.2)  
 
Let us assume that the time taken to identify an infective is another random variable, independent 
of already existing infectives i(t) and has some distribution X(t). Therefore, using (3.2), the 




(  ) (1 ) ( )     s t s t kkP t e e dX t
β β∞ − − −= −∫ [2]       (3.3)   
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With smallpox, an infective is identified when s/he shows clinical symptoms. Let us assume that 
the time taken to identify an infective is uniformly distributed over the interval (0,τ)  where τ is 
the incubation period. Suppose 
 
0                 t < 0
X(t) =      t/           0






        (3.4) 
 













= k ≥          (3.5) 
 











= [2]          (3.6) 
 
Note: In order to control the epidemics, the removal rate γ has to be greater than the birth 




















γ β β τ
⎡ ⎤⎛ −
= + −⎢ ⎜− ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎞
⎥⎟ [3]       (3.7)  
where δ is the death rate due to smallpox.  
 
Adding (3.7) and (3.1), we get the total number of deaths due to the disease. Therefore, the best 
strategy, according to this model would be to implement a vaccination program that minimizes 
the sum of (3.7) and (3.1). 
 
3.3 Case Study 1: An epidemic model with Mass Transportation 
 We extend SEIR and vaccination model to develop a frame-work for the spread of the 
smallpox on a mass transportation. In the model, the city is divided into two neighborhoods:  first 
is composed of long term residents (neighborhood 1) and the second consist of tourist 
(neighborhood 2). Each neighborhood is sub-divided into two groups: those who use Mass 
Transportation (Mass Transportation Users) and those who don’t (Non-Mass Transportation 
Users). The model assumes that individuals mix proportionally. In order to explain proportionate 
mixing, let us introduce the mixing matrix , where  represents proportion of contacts 
of individuals in neighborhood i with individuals in neighborhood given that individual in 
neighborhood  had  a contact  with a member of total population at time t. The proportionate 
mixing here corresponds to case where  is independent of i , that is , 
 ( )i jP t  ( )i jP t
j
i












where denotes the average activity level (the contact rate) of individuals in group k = 1,2 [11]. kC
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 Within a neighborhood, those who are MTU have contacts with other MTU and NMTU. 
MTU can also have a contact with MTU from the other neighborhood while sharing the same 
ride, otherwise, a contact between MTU from the two different neighborhoods is negligible. In 
addition, it is assumed that NMTU make most of the contacts (that leads to infection) only within 
their own neighborhood. 
 Suppose, at some point in time, a fixed number of infected individuals are introduced in 
the MTS (Mass Transportation System). These infected individuals take the infection back to 
their respective neighborhoods and start transmitting infection to individuals with whom they 
have close contacts. When a symptomatic individual comes to a hospital for treatment, at t = 0, 
the smallpox is officially detected, and a wide-spread vaccination policy is implemented. 
Depending on the epidemiological status of the disease, the individuals fall into one of the five 
classes: susceptible, exposed, infected, recovered, and dead, , ,  andiS iE iI iR iD  for MTU  and 
, , ,iW iX iY iZ and  for NMTU. The total population of MTU is denoted by 
and of NMTU is given by 
 
iU
( ) ( ) + ( ) ( ) + ( ) i i i i iQ t S t E t I t R t= +
( ) ( ) + ( ) ( ) + ( ).   i i i i iT t W t X t Y t Z t= +
 For the simulation, we assume that the size of the resident population is 8 million and the 
tourist population is around 200000. Other, parameters have been estimated roughly using 
historical knowledge about smallpox. For example, the average case-fatality is adjusted to be 
0.15 instead of 0.3 used by Kaplan [9]. The choice reflects an assumption that a person 
vaccinated 30 years ago still has some immunity. The model also assumes that death due to 
smallpox is exponentially distributed, so death rate is given by  
d = . The next table outlines the rest of the parameters. ln(0.85) /14 0.0116− =
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Table 2: Parameters and their corresponding values. i refers to the index of a neighborhood [4]: 
 
Definitions Parameters Baseline Values Suitable range 
Natural Death rate  μ  0.033  
Net inflow rate of  MTU 
and NMTU 
  ,  1, 2.i iand iΠ Γ = 0.166 , 0.166  
Death rate due to smallpox δ  0.0116 [0.0116, 0.0255] 
Vaccination rate 
1 2q and q  Control parameter [0.2, 1.0], [0.2, 1.0] 
Progression rate from 
latency to infectious  
Ω  0.086  
Recovery rate α  0.086  
Per capita Contact rate of 
NMTU  
,  1, 2.ia i =  5 and 15  
Per capita Contact rate of 
MTU 
,  1, 2.ib i =  10 and 30  
Transmission rate per 
contact 
, 1, 2.i iβ =  0.5, 0.5  
Proportion of time spent on 
MTS 
, 1, 2.ir i =  0.6 and 0.1  
Proportion of time spent off 
MTS 
,  1, 2.iw i =  0.4 and 0.9  
Vaccination efficacy in 
susceptible and exposed 
1 2and v v  0.97 and 0.3 [0.95,1.0],[0.3, 0.95] 
Vaccine fatality rate f 0.000001  
 
 The choice of  and1 0.6r = 2 0.1r =  tells us that, on average, the proportion of time that 
tourists spend on MTS is much higher than local residents. Baseline values for per capita contact 
rates reflect residents spending more time in their own neighborhood (in less crowded place) 




Table 3: Expressions for Mixing Probabilities of individuals from different neighborhoods (i refers to the index of a 
neighborhood) [4] 
 
Mixing Probabilities between/of Notation Expression 
NMTU and NMTU in the same 
neighborhood 
i iaaP  i i
i i i i i
a T
a T b rQ+
 
NMTU and MTU from same 
neighborhood 
i ibaP  i i i
i i i i i
b rQ
a T b rQ+
 
MTU and NMTU from same 
neighborhood 
ii ab
P  i i
i
i i i i i
a T r
a T b rQ+
 
MTU and MTU from same neighborhood 
i ib b
P
 i i i i
i i i i i
b rQ r
a T b rQ+
 




1 1 1 2 2 2
j j jb w Q
b w Q b w Q+
 
NMTU from neighborhood i and j 
(Assume i j ) ≠
i ja aP  0 
NMTU from neighborhood i and  MTU 
from neighborhood j (Assume i j ) ≠
ji baP  0 
 
 
The 6th entry of Table 3 tells us that NMTU from neighborhood i and NMTU from neighborhood 
j does not have any contacts, and 7th entry tells us that the same is true between NMTU from one 
neighborhood and MTU from the other. In addition, and  that appear on the table are 
fractions of contact times that MTU spend on or off the MTS, respectively. We assume that for 









( ) ( ) ,                                                       
( ) ( ) ,                                                         
( ) ,                  
i





dS t q v S
dt
dE t q v E
dt





= Π − Λ − +
= Λ − + Ω +
= Ω − + +
1 2
1 2
                                              
(1 ) (1 ) ,                        
( ) ( ) ,      
i
i i i i i i
i
i i i i i
dR I R f q v S f q v E
dt












⎪= − + − + − ⎪
⎪
⎪= + + +
⎪⎭
   (3.8)  
 




( ) ( ) ,                                                           
( ) ( ) ,                                                        
( ) ,              
i
i i i i
i
i i i i
i
i i
dW t q v W
dt
dX t q v X
dt





= Γ − Β − +
= Β − + Ω +
= Ω − + +
1 2
1 2
                                                   
(1 ) (1 )                       
( ) ( )            
i
i i i i i i
i
i i i i
dZ I Z f q v W f q v X
dt












⎪= − + − + − ⎪
⎪
⎪= + + +
⎪⎭
   (3.9) 
 
( ) and ( )i tΛ Βi t  corresponds to the infection rates of  MTU, and NMTU respectively. The 





( )                          j ji i ii i i i ii i i i
ji i i i i i j j
ab b b b bj
YY r It b S P P P





Λ = + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
∑    (3.10) 
( )                                             i i ii i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
a a a b
Y r It aW P P
Q T r Q T r
β
⎛ ⎞
Β = +⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
    (3.11)  
 
“According to the author [4], the probability that an individual at neighborhood 1 has contact 
with individuals in neighborhood 2, given that s/he has had a contact, is given by weighted 
proportion of neighborhood 2 individuals’ activity in the total population. The probability is 
independent of neighborhood 1 individuals.” It is obvious that MTU do not spend all their time 
in their own neighborhoods, therefore to accommodate this fact, MTU contacts are distributed 
appropriately. For example, =
i ia b
P i i i
i i i i i
b rQ
a T b rQ+
, is the mixing probability of NMTU and MTU 
from same neighborhood i. Here, the numerator represents the average activity of MTU and 
denominator represents the average total activities in the neighborhood i.  
 
Simulation Results: 
Other initial values are: , 1 1(0) (0) 4000000S W= = 2 2(0) (0) 100000S W= = , 
, and rest of the states are initially zero. In the simulation, we vary two key 
parameters,  and look at impact on total number of cases and deaths respectively. The 
following graphs show the result of simulation for different values of . 
1 2(0) 70,  (0) 30I I= =
2q1  and q
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Figure 13: (a), (c), (e), (g) and (i) show the infective cases in the entire population, and (b), (d), (f), (h), and (j) show 
cumulative deaths. 
 
Fig. 13(a) and (b) show that if 90% of each of the neighborhoods is vaccinated, the epidemic is 
rapidly controlled. Fig. 13(a) shows that by 50 days, there are barely any new infectives coming 
into the population. Fig. 13(b) show that total number of deaths is around 43. The next set of 
graphs, Figure 13(c) and 13(d) with 50% vaccination of each of the neighborhoods show that 
epidemic could still be controlled but at the cost of more lives. The graph on the right hand side, 
Fig. 13(d) shows that cumulative deaths at the end of 50 days exceed 125. The lower two graphs, 
Figure 13(e) and 13(f) show that with only 30% of population vaccinated, the epidemic lasts 
longer and results in much higher deaths that when 50% of population is vaccinated. At end of 
50 days, there are almost 900 deaths. Fig. 13(g) and 13(h) represent 90% vaccination of 
neighborhood 1 and 10% vaccination of neighborhood 2. These graphs clearly indicate a 
growing epidemic. Fig. 13(h) shows that the cumulative deaths exceed 2200 at the end of 50 
days. With  even though 90.25% of the total population is vaccinated, it is 
not sufficient to prevent an epidemic. The result clearly suggests that even though tourist 
population is much smaller in size, it should not be ignored while planning a vaccination policy. 
1 2= 0.9 and 0.1,q q =
The last two graphs, 13(i) and 13(j), with 1 2= 0.1 and 0.9q q = show much greater outbreak as 
expected, with cumulative deaths exceeding 13000 at the end of 30 days. The following table 








Table 4: Cumulative deaths at the end of 100 days corresponding to 49 combinations of  vaccination levels. Rows 
correspond to and columns to  1q 2 .q
 
 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
1.0 41 45 52 62 79 112 200 
0.9 42 48 53 63 80 115 208 
0.8 43 48 54 64 83 120 219 
0.7 44 49 56 67 86 128 239 
0.6 46 51 59 71 93 140 276 
0.5 51 57 66 82 110 172 365 
0.4 66 75 91 116 164 280 668 
 
Table 5: Cumulative deaths at the end of 100 days corresponding to 49 combinations of vaccination levels, if 
vaccination is delayed by 1 day.  Rows correspond to  and columns to  1q 2q
 
 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
1.0 68 77 89 108 141 206 374 
0.9 69 78 91 110 144 212 389 
0.8 71 80 93 113 149 220 411 
0.7 73 83 97 119 157 234 450 
0.6 78 88 104 128 170 261 523 
0.5 87 100 118 148 202 323 698 
0.4 118 137 167 216 311 537 1290 
 
Table 6: Cumulative deaths at the end of 100 days corresponding to 49 combinations of vaccination levels, when 
vaccination is delayed by 3 day.  Rows correspond to  and columns with  1q 2q
 
 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
1.0 159 182 215 265 351 521 967 
0.9 162 185 219 270 359 537 1006 
0.8 167 190 224 278 370 558 1066 
0.7 172 197 233 290 389 593 1165 
0.6 182 209 249 312 423 660 1353 
0.5 204 235 283 360 500 812 1789 
0.4 274 322 394 517 754 1318 3173 
 
Now, let us assume the average case fatality rate to be 0.3 not 0.15 as used by Kaplan [9], and 
the vaccine efficacy  on susceptibles to be  0.95, and on exposed to be 0.8, as used by G.K. 
Aldis, and M.G.Roberts in the integral equation paper [1]. With average case fatality rate of 0.3, 
mortality rate due to smallpox . The rest of the parameter values d ln(0.7) /14 0.0255= − =
44 
remain the same. The following table shows the simulation results for 64 combinations of 
vaccination levels. 
 
Table 7: Total number of deaths due to smallpox infection at the end of 100 days for 
, and 64 combinations of vaccination levels. Rows corresponds to  and 
column to  
1 20.0255, 0.95,and 0.8d v v= = = 1q
2q
 
 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
1.0 46 49 54 62 74 97 148 315 
0.9 46 50 55 62 74 97 150 319 
0.8 46 50 55 63 75 97 151 325 
0.7 47 51 56 63 76 100 154 333 
0.6 48 52 57 64 78 102 158 346 
0.5 49 53 58 66 80 106 165 371 
0.4 52 56 62 71 86 114 182 430 
0.3 62 67 74 86 106 145 245 681 
 
According to Table 5, one day delay corresponds to 27 more deaths, and 3 days delay (Table 6) 
corresponds to 118 more deaths compared to no delay both with 100% vaccination level. From 
Table 5 and 6, we can conclude that delay in vaccination imply higher deaths. Table 7 tells us 
that even though we used higher value of d, with higher value for v2, we observe a slightly lower 
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Figure 14: Cumulative incidence and deaths for d 0.0255,=  1 0.95,v =  2 0.8v = , and (a) and 
, (b) ,and . 
1 0.3q =
2 0.8q = 1 0.8q = 2 0.3q =
 
Fig. 14(a) shows that for q1=0.3 and q2=0.8 the total number of deaths is about 320. Fig. 14(b) 
shows that for q1=0.8 and q2=0.3 the total number of deaths is about 74. 
3.4 Case study 2: An epidemic model with five different stages of infection 
 For this case study, we are going to look at a recent study done by Edward H. Kaplan, 
David L. Craft, and Lawrence M.Wein [9]. With the help of a simulink model, the smallpox 
attack in a large city is simulated, and analyzed. The scale of the epidemic is measured by the 
total number of deaths and cases during the epidemic. Using the simulation results, different 
proposed responses like Trace Vaccination (TV), Mass Vaccination (MV), and Quarantine are 
evaluated for their effectiveness. We also perform approximate analysis for MV, which leads to a 
closed-form expression for the total number of deaths.  
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 It is important to understand that TV and MV operate on very different time scales. TV 
requires contact tracing i.e. trace the contacts of infected cases and then perform vaccination, and 
thus proceeds at the pace of the epidemic. TV is not effective if there is no efficient mechanism 
to identify new infected cases before they are infectious. In contrast, MV only depends on the 
number of available vaccinators and the rate at which they can vaccinate, independently of the 
state of the epidemic. Because of these differences, effectiveness of different interventions to 
control the infection is expected to vary.  
 The model incorporate five stages of infections: (1) susceptible (2) infected but 
asymptomatic (showing no clinical symptoms), non infectious, and vaccine-sensitive; (3) 
infected but asymptomatic, noninfectious, and vaccine-in-sensitive; (4) infected but 
asymptomatic and infectious; and (5) infected, symptomatic, and isolated, each exponentially 
distributed in the duration with mean 1jr
−  days spent in the each stage j = 1,2,3 or 4. We assume 
that population is mixing homogeneously. And at the start of the epidemic, reproductive number 
R  =0 βS0
0 / r3 , where S  is the number of susceptibles immediately after the attack, and 0
0 β  is the 
transmission rate per unit time. The model is designed so that it can identify the worst-case 
scenario, that is, identify conditions that lead to maximum deaths. Note that number of deaths 
depends directly on the total number of infected persons, so when emergency response is 
activated, a delay in detection of infectives is expected to lead to higher deaths. 
 An infective with smallpox cannot be detected until s/he is symptomatic (show clinical 
symptoms like rashes). Once the person with clinical symptoms is detected, preferred response 
policy is implemented. The newly symptomatic infective become so called index case [9]. The 
index case then is isolated and interviewed to find out all the recent contacts.  Let c be the list of 
individuals who are now potentially exposed to the disease. In this list there are those who are 
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actually infected by the index case and those who are not. The distinction is important because in 
order to know the disease status of an infected individual, one needs to know the length of time 
the individual has been infected since the detection of the index case. Even more important is the 
probability that this contact is still in the vaccine sensitive stage i.e. in stage 1 of infection at the 
time the index is detected. This is because vaccine is effective only till stage 1 of the infection. 
Out of all the true contacts made by an index, only fraction p is named and traced.  Hence, 
instead of grouping all infected individuals into one big group, the model places them correctly 
into their appropriate stages of disease. All the susceptibles and the asymptomatic individuals 
located via contact tracing enter a verifying/vaccination queue. People are entering the 
tracing/vaccination queue via two ways: (i) via local tracing – tracing of contacts actually 
infected by index i.e. pRo(t), and (ii) via random tracing – tracing of those who are on the list but 
not infected by index i.e. c- pRo(t). 
 Assume that there are n vaccinators/nurses available 24/7, and on average, each can 
vaccinate μ  individuals per day. Note: Those who can be protected by vaccines are susceptibles 
and those in stage 1 of infection, with effective probability of v0 and v1. Those who are 
vaccinated unsuccessfully enter the freely mixing population. A fraction h of individuals in stage 
3 are found febrile, and on average, quarantined for α−1 days. A fraction f of those who are 
vaccinated will die of complications. A fraction δ  of symptomatic cases die of disease. The 
overall model is described by Ordinary differential equations given in the Appendix A [9].  
 
Contact Tracing: 
 Contact tracing is vital because unlike many infectious diseases, a person who is infected 
with smallpox can avoid serious disease complications and infectiousness if vaccinated shortly 
48 
after infection. CDC’s interim response plan, therefore, does not call for mass vaccination in the 
event of a smallpox attack, instead, calls for a surveillance-containment strategy which combines 
the isolation of symptomatic cases accompanied by vaccination of those traced as contacts of 
index cases. The following table provides the list of parameters, baseline values, and suitable 
range for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 8: Parameters for the model with five stages of infection [4, 9]. 
 
Parameter Description Baseline values Suitable range 
β Contact rate 710−  [ ,710− 72 10−× ] 
δ Smallpox death rate 0.3 [0.15, 0.3] 
N Population size 710  710  
n Number of vaccinators 35 10×  [ , ] 310 410
0v  Vaccine efficacy for susceptible 1.0 [0.95, 1.0] 
1v  Vaccine efficacy for exposed 1.0 [0.3, 1] 
c Names generated per index 50 [10,50] 
p Fraction of infectees named by 
index 
0.5 [0.1,1.0] 
f Vaccination fatality rate 610−  610−  
r1 Disease stage 1 rate -1(3 days)   -1(3 days)  
r2 Disease stage 2 rate -1(8 days)  -1(8 days)  
r3 Disease stage 3 rate -1(3 days)  -1(3 days)  
r4 Disease stage 4 rate -1(12 days)  -1(12 days)  
μ  Service rate 50/day (TV), 200/day (MV) 50/day (TV), 
200/day(MV) 
0
1I (- )τ  Initial number infected 
310  310  
τ  Detection Delay 5 days [0,5] 
 
     
I have left the derivation for future work, but will use the equations in the Appendix A to 
simulate and find the approximate solutions. First, let us look at a model without intervention. In 
absence of any interventions, the model reduces to five equations given below. We assume that 
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 We can use Laplace Transformation to find the solution of  (3.12).  Assuming that there 
are no infected individuals in other compartments except at (=01 ( )I t
0
1 ( )I τ− ), and taking the 
Laplace Transformations of equations given in (3.12), we get 
 
0 0 0
1 1 3 0 3 1
0 0
2 2 1 1
0 0
3 3 2 2
0 0
4 4 3 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
s r I s r R I s I
s r I s r I s
s r I s r I s
s r I s r I s
τ+ − = − ⎫
⎪+ − = ⎪
⎬
+ − = ⎪
⎪+ − = ⎭
        (3.13) 
 
 Note: Majority of infected individuals at stage 3 are those exposed in the initial attack, and at t = 
0, the size is almost negligible. Thus, taking first part of (3.13) and letting  , and 
substituting A for 
0
3 0 3 ( ) 0r R I s =
0
1 ( )I τ− , we get 
0 31 2 1 2
3
1 2 3 1 2
( )
( )( )( )
crr A c cI s
s r s r s r s r s r s r
−
= = +
+ + + + + + 3
+  where , and  are arbitrary constants 
to be found. Using partial fraction expansion, we get 
1c 2c 3c
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1 1
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( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )(
r r A r r Ac s r
s r s r s r r r r rs r
− −
= + =
+ + + − −=− 3 )
 
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 22
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )(
r r A r r Ac s r
s r s r s r r r r rs r
−
= + =
+ + + − −=− 3 )
 
1 2 1 2
3 3
1 2 3 1 3 23
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )(
r r A r r Ac s r
s r s r s r r r r rs r
− −
= + =
+ + + − −=− 3 )
 
Therefore, 
0 1 2 1 2 1 2
3
1 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 3
( )
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r r A rr A rr AI s
s r r r r r s r r r r r s r r r r r
−
= + −
+ − − + − − + − − )
 
Taking inverse Laplace transform, we get 
31 20
1 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 2( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
r tr t r tr r r r r r I t r r A r r e r r e r r e−− −− − − = − − − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , so 
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For [ ], 0t τ= − , using 03 ( ) ( )I t g t τ≈ + , we get 
 
1 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 3 3 1 1 20 0
3 1
1 2 2 3 1 3
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Substituting ( )g t τ+ for in second, third, fourth equation of (3.12), and solving them, we 
get 
0
3 ( )I t
 
51 
[ ]1 ( ) 2 01 1 0 3 1 0 30
1 2
1
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ,
r te r I R r g r t R r
I t
r
τ τ τ− + − + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
g
      (3.15) 
 
[ ]
1 2 2 1 2
1 2
( 2 )( ) 2 )( ) ( )( )0 2 2 0 2
2 2 1 1 0 3 12
1 1 2 2
( 2 )( )
0 1 2 3 2 1 2
1( ) { ( ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ( ) 1) )},
r r t r t r r t
r r t
2 0
2 1 0 3I t e e r r I R r g e r r Ir r r r





− + + − + + +
+ +
= − + + R r g− +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣−
+ − − + + −
⎦  





( )( ) .
2
r g tI t τ+=           (3.17) 
 
Equation (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), and (3.17) are the solutions of the model without any 
interventions. According to these solutions, the number of people in each of the stages of 
infection gradually rises to a maximum and then decreases to zero at t tend to infinity. 
The following simulink diagram was used to simulate and find the solution curves shown in Fig. 




























































Figure 15: The simulink diagram for the model without intervention. 
 
 






























Figure 16: Solutions of the model without intervention using parameter values listed in Table 8. 
 
Fig.16 shows that without intervention, the whole population becomes infected with peak at 




 The question is not whether a disease is going to be endemic or not but under what 
circumstances can we eradicate the infection with minimum loss of lives and economic activities. 
For smallpox there is no cure, so the only way to prevent an individual from acquiring the 
infection is by putting the person into isolation until the disease die out or by vaccinating the 
individual when s/he is still susceptible. 
 
Mass Vaccination:  
a) Perfect vaccination ( ) 0 1 1v v= =
 Once the first infection is confirmed, under this measure, nearly everyone threatened by 
the outbreak will be vaccinated. Except for the last few hours, let us assume that the total number 
of people waiting in a line to be vaccinated is more than the number of vaccinators. Since there 
are n vaccinators and can vaccinate µ people per day, vaccination will be completed in T = N/nµ 
days. This implies that in any given day, total number of people waiting in queue is given 
by . So, for0 0 for( ) (0)      t [0,T]Q t Q nµt= − ∈ t [0,T]∈ , the infection term 03 ( ) ( )I t S tβ  can be 
approximated by . Note: All the people in 3 0 3(1- / ) ( )r R t T I t
0 ( )jI t compartments automatically 
move to , and we assume that vaccinations per given time follow a uniform distribution 




 To approximate the number of people who are going to die under this measure, we have 
to carefully track the number of people that enter stage 2 of infection. Since it takes some 
number of days to realize, and decide on the use of a particular intervention, by then, there will 
be 4
2
( )jj I t=∑ number of people in or beyond stage 2 of the infection. Besides, people who are in 
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stage 1 of infection move to stage 2 if not vaccinated during first three days. According to the 
model, people in stage 1 progress to stage 2 of infection at a time, that is exponentially 
distributed with  [9].  Although everyone will be vaccinated between 0 to T, not everyone will 


















To calculate the number of deaths of susceptibles, the model uses two approximations:  
(1) 03 ( ) ( )I t S tβ  by , and  (2) by linear growth term3 0 3(1- / ) ( )r R t T I t 3 ( )I t 3
(0)Ig
τ
= .  
Note: Most of the people who die are infected before MV is started. On the other hand, the 
susceptibles who die during the epidemic, are infected during t [0,T]∈ , and evolve to stage 2 of 
infection after spending exponential distributed length of time in stage 1. Although most of the 
people are vaccinated at a time uniformly distributed between t and T, it cannot prevent all the 
deaths. Hence, the total number of susceptibles at time 0 who die during epidemics is given by 
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Note: fN is total number of deaths due to vaccination where f  is the fatality rate for the 
smallpox vaccine. 
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585 (for parameter values given in Table 8)=  
 
According to equation (3.19), the total number deaths under MV depend mostly on  the 
initial size of attack, and very little on the size of the population. The total deaths also scale with 
basic reproduction number , and the vaccination capacity nµ = N/T. The following graphs 
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s Ro = 3
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Figure 17: The number of deaths under MV 
versus (a) time, and for Ro = 3, (b) time, and 
for Ro = 6, (c)  the reproductive number, (d) 
the number of vaccinators, (e) the vaccine 
efficacy at stage 1, (f) the number initially 
infected, and (g) time delays for Ro = 3, and 
Ro = 6. 
 



























Fig. 17(a) and (b) show that for Ro = 3 and 6, the total number of deaths are 580 and 810 
respectively. Fig.17(c)-(f) show the number of deaths, as a function of, the reproductive number, 
the number of vaccinators , the vaccine efficacy at stage 1, and the initial size of attack 
respectively. Fig. 17(g) shows the number of deaths as a function of time delay. Clearly, the total 
number of deaths scale with the reproductive number, the number of people initially infected, 
and time delays. According to simulation result, higher reproductive number corresponds to 
higher deaths. Bigger initial size of attack also translates to higher casualties. As for time delays, 
it is quite clear from Fig. 17(g) that sooner the response less the number of casualties and vice 
versa. Fig. 17(d) shows that increasing the number of vaccinators decreases the number of 
deaths, but only up to certain point. From the figure, it is clear that increasing the number of 
vaccinators beyond 5500 have very little effect on the size of epidemic. Role of vaccine efficacy 
in stage 1 of infection is quite clear as well. Fig. 17(e) confirms that low vaccine efficacy in stage 
1 of infection corresponds to more deaths. There is a difference of 40 deaths for vaccine efficacy 
of 0.8 and 1. 
 
b) Imperfect Vaccination  
For the simulation, we used . 
0 1
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Figure 18: (a) Number of deaths versus time, and (b) Number of people in Queue versus time. 
 
Fig. 18(a) shows that at the end of 100 days, total number of deaths under imperfect vaccination, 
(with  ) exceeds 900, almost 320 more than under perfect vaccination. The 
number of people in the queue sharply drops down to zero within 10 days. 
0 1
= 0.95 and 0.9v v =
 
Table 9: Lists of cumulative deaths for 49 combinations of vaccine efficacies. Columns correspond to  and the 




 1.0 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 
1.0 580 590 599 609 619 628 638 
0.95 654 665 677 688 699 711 722 
0.9 759 773 786 800 814 828 842 
0.85 922 939 957 974 992 1009 1027 
0.8 1205 1229 1253 1277 1301 1326 1350 
0.75 1809 1845 1884 1922 1960 1999 2038 
0.7 3551 3627 3704 3782 3859 3938 4016 
 




We used a simulink model to find the numerical solutions to the set of equations given in the 
Appendix A.  The results are given below. 
 
 (a)        (b)  0 3R = 0 3R =

































              

































 (c)        (d)  0 4.5R = 0 4.5R =

































               




































Figure 19: (a) and (c) correspond to the number of people recovered versus time, and (b) and (d) correspond to the 
number of deaths versus time for  and 0 3R = 0 4.5R = respectively. 
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Fig. 19(b) shows that the total number of deaths under TV for 0 3R =  is approximately 140000. 
Fig. 19 (d) shows that the total number of deaths under TV for 0 4.5R = is approximately 
260000. The total number of deaths under TV is much higher than compare to MV. 
 
Quarantine: 
 Quarantine is one of the intervention policy considered for simulation. Quarantine of 
symptomatic cases helps to control initial phase of epidemic. Quarantine can lessen the amount 
of time during which an infectious person can mix in the population, and thus inhibit 
transmission of disease. But quarantine alone, is not guaranteed to prevent epidemic, since some 
infected people will enter and leave quarantine before becoming infectious, and keep 
transmitting infection freely. Overall, quarantine reduces the mean time spent on stage 1, stage 2, 
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Table 10: Number of days quarantined vs. total deaths. 
 
Value ofα   1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 
Total number of 
deaths 
131600 102430 79922 65640 55794 48585 43087 38766 
 
Value ofα   1/9 1/10 1/11 1/12 1/13 1/14 1/15 1/16 
Total number of 
deaths 
35285 32426 30040 28021 26294 24800 23498 22353 
 
Sensitivity analysis: 
Table 11: Total number of deaths under 49 combinations of vaccinators count, and the service rate. Rows denote 
number of vaccinators n, and columns represent service rate µ. 
 
 1000 3000 5000 8000 10000 15000 20000 
10 2477700 1825600 1217900 585910 376930 187990 148230 
30 1824700 463160 187120 144960 144960 144960 144960 
50 1215900 186950 144890 144890 144890 144890 144890 
70 746530 145810 144860 144860 144860 144860 144860 
90 462570 144840 144840 144840 144840 144840 144840 
100 374800 144840 144840 144840 144840 144840 144840 
200 147560 144810 144810 144810 144810 144810 144810 
 
Under TV, Table 11 shows that increasing n and µ beyond 3000 and 70 respectively, does not 
reduce the total number of deaths. This is because the maximum length of queue is less than the 
product of n and µ. Fig. 20 confirms this. The difference between product n µ, and the peak 
values are 85900, 5200, 900, and 1140 for of (a), (b), (c), and (d) respectively. From the trend, 
we can see that the difference is minimum for the value of µ equal to 70, and n in the range of 
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Figure 20: The queue length as a function of time for (a) n = 3000 and µ = 70, (b) n = 3000 and µ = 68, (c) n = 2910 
and µ = 70, (d) n = 2905 and µ = 70. 
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Figure 21: Sensitivity analysis for uncertain model parameters under TV using baseline parameters. The total 
number of deaths versus (a) Number of contacts per index c, ( b) the smallpox death rate δ, (c) Reproductive number 
Ro, (d) Vaccine efficacy, stage 1, (e) the total number of vaccinators n, (f) the tracing/ vaccination rate µ, (g) the 
initial attack size 01 ( )I τ−  
 
 Fig. 21 shows simulated results for number of deaths versus seven key parameters.  
Fig. 21(a) shows that the number of deaths is roughly inversely proportional to the number of 
contacts generated per index. Fig. 21(b) shows that the number of deaths is roughly proportional 
to smallpox death rate. Fig. 21(c) shows two kinks: first one seems to be at around Ro = 1, and 
the second one seems to be around Ro = 4. Fig. 21(d) shows that the total number of deaths 
decreases linearly as vaccine efficacy for stage 1 increases. Fig.21 (e) and (f) show that the total 
number of deaths, are proportional to the inverses of the number of vaccinators and the 
tracing/vaccination rate. Fig. 21(g) shows that total number of deaths is proportional to initial 




 The first case study incorporates 2 neighborhoods each with 2 sub-groups, and the second 
case study includes 5 stages of infection, however, the fundamental assumption that population 
mixes more or less homogeneously is unrealistic. Individuals tend to make contact with family 
members, workplace colleagues and friends at much higher rate than random strangers, and such 
regular contacts also tends to be in the same neighborhood areas. Hence to get better result, one 
needs to include socio-spatial structure. More realistic model would have to capture age/social 
structure, network structure, patch structure and some stochastic effects [7]. The only problem 
with any such inclusion is that there will be many more parameters, hence is much difficult to 
formulate equations, and the computation is more much intensive and time consuming. 
Therefore, stochastic models might capture the random nature of disease transmission, but 
deterministic models are rapid to simulate, relatively easy to parameterize and captures average 
behavior.  
 
4.2 Strategies available prevent worst-case scenarios: 
 In case of a smallpox outbreak, major control strategies that are available to Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) to implement, are- quarantine/isolation, movement restrictions, trace 
vaccination, targeted Vaccination, mass vaccination and pre-attack/prophylactic vaccination. 
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Quarantine/ isolation of confirmed index cases can be highly effective in reducing secondary 
transmission as shown in Table 10, as long as most of index cases and their contacts are rapidly 
detected. Movement restriction (not explored in our models), can be effective if the host patch is 
recognized on time. Host patch can be airport, subway stations, schools or some specific 
neighborhood. On the other hand, TV (trace the contacts and vaccinate when found), coupled 
with isolation could be highly effective for a small scale attack but not so effective, for big scale 
outbreak as shown in case study two. For TV to effective, contacts need to be detected in the 
vaccine sensitive stages of incubation period. On the contrary, targeted vaccination (not explored 
in our models) does not depend on contact tracing. It requires vaccinating whole population in 
affected neighborhood or city, and thus increasing herd immunity quickly. A draw back with this 
intervention policy is that the disease might spread beyond targeted area. Mass vaccination, 
which we have simulated, is highly effective in stopping the epidemic, if CDC can carry out 
large scale vaccination program rapidly without creating any chaos. The risk involved is that in 
case of small isolated outbreak, it might cause more deaths than other methods. The last option, 
pre-attack vaccination is essential in protecting the health officials who are going to be involved 
in emergency response. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 An ideal model should have to explicitly incorporate the underlying mechanisms of the 
control strategies. In addition, the model should have to incorporate realistic logistical constraints 
[7], and economic costs. For example, the trace vaccination is constrained to the speed of the 
epidemic, whereas mass vaccination can proceed as quickly as logistics allows. The net result of 
this would be that it would produce realistic R0. But one has to keep in mind that estimating 
effect on Ro with all other details is practically impossible for complex models that include 
population heterogeneity and realistic other parameters. The need to increase accuracy and 
sophistication makes it difficult to validate models. I think the key is to balance between model 
complexity and validation. And validation, ideally, should be independent of any 
epidemiological data used to estimate parameters. Historical data doesn’t capture the status of 
human populations with respect to immunity, mobility and patterns of social interaction; 
therefore, extrapolating from historical data to present day population is quite often very 
inaccurate. While recognizing the limitation of modeling for precise prediction, models still 
represent the potentially powerful resource in the face of an actual epidemic. The 2001 foot-and-
mouth disease epidemic in Britain clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of real time statistical 
analysis and modeling in predicting the future course of the outbreak and identifying the 
measures needed for control. For small pox such a role is even more critical in containing the 
outbreak and thus minimizing the fatalities. 
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APPENDIX: EQUATIONS FOR THE CASE STUDY 2 
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Here we consider the equations that govern the model presented by Kaplan, Craft, and Wein. [9] 
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